Two Down, 48 More to Go
Jan. 30th, 2007 08:03 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
le_bebna_kamniI've been so busy this past week that I've only had brief moments to finish the last 34 pages of the book (not including the endnotes, of course. I don't usually include them in the count, but when you have a 237 page book with an additional 62 pages of end notes ‒ equal to about 25% of the text ‒ I think they should count).
Book #2: The End of Faith, by Sam Harris
I have to say, I wasn't impressed, and I can't see myself picking up another of Sam Harris's books any time soon. While the man is great with his philosophy, his understanding of human nature is poor and his science is atrocious (I have a particular bone to pick with him on his understanding of mathematics and the scientific method). The list of things I would dispute takes up multiple notebook pages, and none of them are covered in his "Afterword", which is a rebuttal to the most common objections he receives.
Sam Harris's book revolves around the premise that religious faith is detrimental to a modern scientific world. At best, he says that it hinders us from understanding the world and maintaining basic civility; at worst, it causes vast amounts of bloodshed, as evidenced by numerous holy wars of various faiths ‒ a scary prospect for modern times when one throws nuclear armaments into the mix. While there are many forms of dangerous and harmful ideas, both secular and sacred, religious faith is particularly egregious because it can't be questioned. For most people, once the words "Because God said so" come into play, all rational discourse is thrown out the window. Therefore, he suggests, we must rid ourselves of irrational faith if we ever hope to survive in a global society.
He illustrates his thesis nicely in his first five chapters, which discuss the issue of faith, the history of Christianity and Islam, and current laws in the U.S. that are religiously based. But reader beware: if you feel anything but contempt for Muslims, you may find yourself cringing through his fourth chapter, "The Problem With Islam", when he mentions engaging in preemptive nuclear war and suggests installing benign non-Muslim dictatorships in Muslim countries.
I was uncertain how I felt about the book after the first five chapters, but it was his last two chapters (and epilogue) that made me rethink buying the book. His sixth chapter, "A Science of Good and Evil", was the one that I disliked the most. In it, he tries to show that we can find an objective measure of morality through science. Anyone who doesn't know what my stance is on "objective morality" can read my August 9th entry. But there are a few specific things in that chapter worth mentioning:
Harris puts great stock in intuition as a base for morality. This in itself is not unacceptable, as most people I know do the same, as long as people remember that intuition is subjective. However, he attempts to make intuition seem objective by equating it with methods of science, which I find both faulty and annoying.
Throughout the chapter he misuses the term "intuitive" with phrases like "the intuitive content of rational thinking". First and foremost, intuition and rational thinking are by definition mutually exclusive of each other, as demonstrated by a quick reference of Webster's:
Harris claims that reasoning is at its core intuitive, that we must all make "leaps of logic" and just accept things that are "obvious". Yet this is the very antithesis of the scientific method, which says that you have to test everything ‒ especially those which seem obvious. Even "cause and effect", which Harris directly takes for granted in his book, has been tested by scientists (and, ironically, found to be untrue on the quantum level ‒ at least according to a physicist friend of mine). While intuition may make for a good hypothesis, any scientist who tried to propose a theory based on just intuition would be laughed out of tenure. Yet Harris seems to be proposing just that.
Where he particularly irks me is on his understanding of mathematicians. While it is true that the solution of many abstract problems has come about through sudden unexplained insights, it's never acceptable to say that something is "obvious" in mathematics, as any elementary proofs class will show you. Most sciences say that you can't actually prove anything, only amass overwhelming supporting evidence. Yet mathematicians say just the opposite: that you can only know something if you have proven it. That's why mathematicians will get credit for proving statements like "two odd numbers added together will always be even". Sure, it seems "obvious", but how do you prove that ALL odd numbers follow that rule, and not just the finite number of examples you might like to show your professor?
His further misunderstanding of science is evidenced by his belief in science as a prescriptive field rather than a descriptive field. The nature of science is to tell us how the world is ‒ for example, it might describe a particular phenomenon such as gravity and try to explain how it occurs. It can sometimes be predictive, saying that based on certain conclusions we can expect to see these outcomes, but if the predictions don't match what can be observed, the theory has to be thrown out.
But science isn't about telling how things ought to be (i.e., being prescriptive). They might observe that two bodies of mass attract each other, and predict that all masses will act that way. But they don't say that masses have to act that way, no matter what. In fact, if scientists started observing two masses repelling each other on a regular basis, they would probably have to rethink the theory of gravity. Yet this is exactly what Harris seems to be proposing by bringing science into the debate (which he does several times by making analogies to science). He claims that we can use science prescriptively to dictate moral behavior.
It's at this point that his logic falls through. Let's take the abhorrent act of rape. Scientifically speaking, many different species commit rape, including intelligent ones ‒ dolphins, chimpanzees (our closest relatives), and of course humans. This behavior has been observed many times over by descriptive science. If we were to base our morality on science, one could make a very strong case that because our chimpanzee cousins do it (and we share many other behavioral traits with them), rape is perfectly natural and should be most certainly be allowed in the scope of being moral.
The use of science for morality (or any other idealism) is a dangerous prospect. European scientists used their craft to justify the superiority of the white race (or for a modern example, think The Bell Curve, by Richard J. Herrnstein), as did the Nazis. True, we can always chock those up to bad science, but isn't hindsight always 20-20? At the time, people believed that they were engaging in perfectly valid science, as do people who study creationism or even people who try to show that homosexuality doesn't have a genetic component (and should thus be considered a moral failing). How then can we trust any other use of science to justify a particular set of ethics?
Sam Harris also seems to have a very idealized sense of human nature. He assumes that if we could all just appeal to human reason we could somehow do away with things like murder and hate crimes and other things immoral. If human beings were rational all the time ‒ even most of the time ‒ I might grant him at least a huge reduction in immorality. Yet the book I'm currently reading, The Happiness Hypothesis, shows multiple studies demonstrating that even the most logically-minded of us is ruled more by our subconscious "gut instinct" than our conscious rationality. Most of our "rational" processing is done after the subconscious comes up with an answer ‒ i.e., our mental explanations justify what our brain has already decided, and even the most intelligent of us is rarely aware that we do this.
While religion may certainly contribute to wars and acts of terrorism, it's not the source of all our evils. Take environmental groups who perform terrorist actions. They certainly think of themselves as rational people, and a large portion of them are not particularly religious. They aren't acting simply on "because God said so" ‒ they have read the facts, know that legislation tends to be slow and ineffective, and have consciously come to the conclusion that the only way to be heard is to perform highly visible acts of terrorism. Or let's take the example of a person who robs a 7-11. They might be desperate to raise some cash to pay rent, or maybe they just want it to buy drugs, but they've probably thought about their options and come to the conclusion that it's the only way to get the money they need in the amount of time that they have to get it. It's highly unlikely that they're doing it for religious reasons (in fact, one might argue that fundamentalists are less likely to commit robbery). There are a thousand and one ills that plague our world, and simply becoming not religious won't make us any less likely to perpetuate them.
Human nature is varied. As our chimpanzee cousins show us, it's just as natural to be altruistic as it is to be selfish. We have natural instincts for the Golden Rule just as much as "eye-for-an-eye" (in fact, there is some evidence to believe that the same instinctual mechanisms generate both, but you'll have to read The Happiness Hypothesis to get the full explanation). Even if religion were to disappear tomorrow, we would still have people enacting the same kinds of dramas and wars we have today, just for different reasons. There is little likelihood that we'll suddenly become "rational" and start thinking the way Sam Harris thinks we should.
So while I could recommend the book simply for an alternative viewpoint, it doesn't rank highly on my recommendation list. I'll put my energies into books that know a little bit more about science and human psychology.
Book #2: The End of Faith, by Sam Harris
I have to say, I wasn't impressed, and I can't see myself picking up another of Sam Harris's books any time soon. While the man is great with his philosophy, his understanding of human nature is poor and his science is atrocious (I have a particular bone to pick with him on his understanding of mathematics and the scientific method). The list of things I would dispute takes up multiple notebook pages, and none of them are covered in his "Afterword", which is a rebuttal to the most common objections he receives.
Sam Harris's book revolves around the premise that religious faith is detrimental to a modern scientific world. At best, he says that it hinders us from understanding the world and maintaining basic civility; at worst, it causes vast amounts of bloodshed, as evidenced by numerous holy wars of various faiths ‒ a scary prospect for modern times when one throws nuclear armaments into the mix. While there are many forms of dangerous and harmful ideas, both secular and sacred, religious faith is particularly egregious because it can't be questioned. For most people, once the words "Because God said so" come into play, all rational discourse is thrown out the window. Therefore, he suggests, we must rid ourselves of irrational faith if we ever hope to survive in a global society.
He illustrates his thesis nicely in his first five chapters, which discuss the issue of faith, the history of Christianity and Islam, and current laws in the U.S. that are religiously based. But reader beware: if you feel anything but contempt for Muslims, you may find yourself cringing through his fourth chapter, "The Problem With Islam", when he mentions engaging in preemptive nuclear war and suggests installing benign non-Muslim dictatorships in Muslim countries.
I was uncertain how I felt about the book after the first five chapters, but it was his last two chapters (and epilogue) that made me rethink buying the book. His sixth chapter, "A Science of Good and Evil", was the one that I disliked the most. In it, he tries to show that we can find an objective measure of morality through science. Anyone who doesn't know what my stance is on "objective morality" can read my August 9th entry. But there are a few specific things in that chapter worth mentioning:
Harris puts great stock in intuition as a base for morality. This in itself is not unacceptable, as most people I know do the same, as long as people remember that intuition is subjective. However, he attempts to make intuition seem objective by equating it with methods of science, which I find both faulty and annoying.
Throughout the chapter he misuses the term "intuitive" with phrases like "the intuitive content of rational thinking". First and foremost, intuition and rational thinking are by definition mutually exclusive of each other, as demonstrated by a quick reference of Webster's:
intuition
1) the direct knowing or learning of something without the conscious use of reasoning; immediate understanding
2) something known or learned in this way
3) the ability to perceive or know things without conscious reasoning
Harris claims that reasoning is at its core intuitive, that we must all make "leaps of logic" and just accept things that are "obvious". Yet this is the very antithesis of the scientific method, which says that you have to test everything ‒ especially those which seem obvious. Even "cause and effect", which Harris directly takes for granted in his book, has been tested by scientists (and, ironically, found to be untrue on the quantum level ‒ at least according to a physicist friend of mine). While intuition may make for a good hypothesis, any scientist who tried to propose a theory based on just intuition would be laughed out of tenure. Yet Harris seems to be proposing just that.
Where he particularly irks me is on his understanding of mathematicians. While it is true that the solution of many abstract problems has come about through sudden unexplained insights, it's never acceptable to say that something is "obvious" in mathematics, as any elementary proofs class will show you. Most sciences say that you can't actually prove anything, only amass overwhelming supporting evidence. Yet mathematicians say just the opposite: that you can only know something if you have proven it. That's why mathematicians will get credit for proving statements like "two odd numbers added together will always be even". Sure, it seems "obvious", but how do you prove that ALL odd numbers follow that rule, and not just the finite number of examples you might like to show your professor?
His further misunderstanding of science is evidenced by his belief in science as a prescriptive field rather than a descriptive field. The nature of science is to tell us how the world is ‒ for example, it might describe a particular phenomenon such as gravity and try to explain how it occurs. It can sometimes be predictive, saying that based on certain conclusions we can expect to see these outcomes, but if the predictions don't match what can be observed, the theory has to be thrown out.
But science isn't about telling how things ought to be (i.e., being prescriptive). They might observe that two bodies of mass attract each other, and predict that all masses will act that way. But they don't say that masses have to act that way, no matter what. In fact, if scientists started observing two masses repelling each other on a regular basis, they would probably have to rethink the theory of gravity. Yet this is exactly what Harris seems to be proposing by bringing science into the debate (which he does several times by making analogies to science). He claims that we can use science prescriptively to dictate moral behavior.
It's at this point that his logic falls through. Let's take the abhorrent act of rape. Scientifically speaking, many different species commit rape, including intelligent ones ‒ dolphins, chimpanzees (our closest relatives), and of course humans. This behavior has been observed many times over by descriptive science. If we were to base our morality on science, one could make a very strong case that because our chimpanzee cousins do it (and we share many other behavioral traits with them), rape is perfectly natural and should be most certainly be allowed in the scope of being moral.
The use of science for morality (or any other idealism) is a dangerous prospect. European scientists used their craft to justify the superiority of the white race (or for a modern example, think The Bell Curve, by Richard J. Herrnstein), as did the Nazis. True, we can always chock those up to bad science, but isn't hindsight always 20-20? At the time, people believed that they were engaging in perfectly valid science, as do people who study creationism or even people who try to show that homosexuality doesn't have a genetic component (and should thus be considered a moral failing). How then can we trust any other use of science to justify a particular set of ethics?
Sam Harris also seems to have a very idealized sense of human nature. He assumes that if we could all just appeal to human reason we could somehow do away with things like murder and hate crimes and other things immoral. If human beings were rational all the time ‒ even most of the time ‒ I might grant him at least a huge reduction in immorality. Yet the book I'm currently reading, The Happiness Hypothesis, shows multiple studies demonstrating that even the most logically-minded of us is ruled more by our subconscious "gut instinct" than our conscious rationality. Most of our "rational" processing is done after the subconscious comes up with an answer ‒ i.e., our mental explanations justify what our brain has already decided, and even the most intelligent of us is rarely aware that we do this.
While religion may certainly contribute to wars and acts of terrorism, it's not the source of all our evils. Take environmental groups who perform terrorist actions. They certainly think of themselves as rational people, and a large portion of them are not particularly religious. They aren't acting simply on "because God said so" ‒ they have read the facts, know that legislation tends to be slow and ineffective, and have consciously come to the conclusion that the only way to be heard is to perform highly visible acts of terrorism. Or let's take the example of a person who robs a 7-11. They might be desperate to raise some cash to pay rent, or maybe they just want it to buy drugs, but they've probably thought about their options and come to the conclusion that it's the only way to get the money they need in the amount of time that they have to get it. It's highly unlikely that they're doing it for religious reasons (in fact, one might argue that fundamentalists are less likely to commit robbery). There are a thousand and one ills that plague our world, and simply becoming not religious won't make us any less likely to perpetuate them.
Human nature is varied. As our chimpanzee cousins show us, it's just as natural to be altruistic as it is to be selfish. We have natural instincts for the Golden Rule just as much as "eye-for-an-eye" (in fact, there is some evidence to believe that the same instinctual mechanisms generate both, but you'll have to read The Happiness Hypothesis to get the full explanation). Even if religion were to disappear tomorrow, we would still have people enacting the same kinds of dramas and wars we have today, just for different reasons. There is little likelihood that we'll suddenly become "rational" and start thinking the way Sam Harris thinks we should.
So while I could recommend the book simply for an alternative viewpoint, it doesn't rank highly on my recommendation list. I'll put my energies into books that know a little bit more about science and human psychology.
